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Withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from 
children  
 
In the past 12 months, there have been two significant Australian decisions that have 
considered the legal right of a competent adult to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment contemporaneously and in advance of the medical situation arising.1  While 
there have been no landmark Australian cases on this point, difficult questions 
regarding the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining medical treatment can 
also arise in relation to children (being those under 18 years old). This editorial 
considers some of the legal principles that are relevant in such cases. 
 
At the very start of life, parents of very premature neonates or those with severe 
congenital conditions may, together with treating medical practitioners, face questions 
over whether to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment during the early stages 
of life.2 For others, these questions may arise later in life where parents reject life-
sustaining medical treatment for their children due to personal beliefs or religious 
reasons.3 Where the child in question is mature, there are questions regarding the 
extent to which the child may make their own decision regarding life-sustaining 
treatment. 
1) General Principles 
 
Generally speaking, if a child lacks capacity, a decision regarding treatment will 
ordinarily fall to those with parental responsibility. If a child satisfies the test for 
Gillick-competence,4 that child may consent to treatment but a refusal of consent may 
be overridden by the courts. The same general principles apply when considering 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. The most important principle 
at law continues to be upholding the ‘best interests’ of the child. 
 
Where disputes do arise, the courts with jurisdiction include the Queensland Supreme 
Court exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and the Family Court exercising federal 
jurisdiction under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 
2) Queensland Legislation 
 
                                                 
1 Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter [2009] WASC 229 and Hunter and New England Area Health 
Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 respectively. 
2 See for example, Re B (A Child) (Medical Treatment) [2008] EWHC 1996 (Fam); [2009] 1 FLR 
1264; Re K (a child) (withdrawal of treatment) [2006] EWHC 1007 (Fam); [2006] 2 FLR 883; Re 
Wyatt (a child) (medical treatment: continuation of order) [2005] EWCA Civ 1181; [2005] 1 WLR 
3995. 
3 For example, cases exist of parents who are Jehovah’s Witnesses refusing to consent to blood 
transfusions for their children and of parents refusing consent to chemotherapy for their child in 
preference for alternative remedies (discussed below).  
4 A child will be considered ‘Gillick-competent’ if he or she has sufficient intelligence and maturity to 
understand the nature and consequences of the particular medical treatment: Secretary, Department of 
Health and Community Services v JMB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218, 237-8, referring to the test 
originally established in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, 
189. 
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In some circumstances, where withholding treatment from a child is at issue, 
legislation may prevent a refusal of consent from operating. In particular, legislation 
exists that governs the situation where any child under 18 years5 requires a blood 
transfusion and there is a refusal to provide consent to that procedure. 
 
In Queensland, blood transfusions can be administered to children in the face of 
refusal of consent (by a parent or another with lawful authority), or where such 
consent has not been obtained.6 The legislation requires that two medical practitioners 
must be of the opinion that a blood transfusion is necessary to ‘preserve the life of the 
child’. The section deems blood transfusions carried out in accordance with the 
legislation to be treated as if they have been carried out with the consent of the parent 
or the person with authority to consent.7 
 
Where there are concerns that in a specific case the legislation may not apply, an 
application can be made to a court to authorise the treatment in the child’s best interests.8  
3) Children without capacity 
 
a) Disputes at the start of life 
 
Often decisions regarding withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment need 
to be made at the start of an infant’s life – especially where an infant is very 
premature or suffers from severe congenital conditions.9 These infants may have very 
little, or no, prospect of recovery or improved quality of life, but still suffer pain and 
are kept alive through life-sustaining medical treatment.  
 
However, in making decisions to withhold or withdraw such treatment, Australia 
lacks judicial guidance. In practice, a decision about whether to withhold or withdraw 
treatment from such young infants will be made by parents in consultation with 
medical practitioners. If the withholding or withdrawal of treatment is in the best 
interests of the child and all parties agree, parents may lawfully refuse such treatment 
and there will be no reason to approach the courts.10 Professional guidelines exist that 
identify circumstances when it might be appropriate to withhold or withdraw 
treatment from infant, in particular those with congenital conditions or who are 
severely premature.11  
                                                 
5  In the Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld), the term ‘child’ is not defined. However, the 
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 36 defines child as an individual under the age of 18 years. 
6 Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld), s 20. 
7 Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld), s 20(2). 
8 See for example, see Re R (2000) 2 Qd R 328.                                                                                                                             
9 A report from a hospital in Victoria found that more than 75% of deaths recorded in the neonatal 
intensive care unit were as a consequence of the withdrawal or withholding of potentially life-saving 
treatment: D J Wilkinson et al, ‘Death in the neonatal intensive care unit: changing patterns 
of end of life care over two decades’ (2006) 91 Archives of Disease in Childhood - Fetal and Neonatal 
Edition F268.  
10 See Re K (a child) (withdrawal of treatment) [2006] EWHC 1007 (Fam); [2006] 2 FLR 883, [42]. 
Note that the best interests standard will not be satisfied at law if parents and practitioners agree to 
withhold treatment from a disabled child (e.g. a child with Down’s syndrome) that would otherwise be 
likely to survive and live a healthy life if the treatment were provided, see Re B (a minor) (wardship: 
medical treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421; R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1.  
11 See for example The Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Paediatrics & Child Health Division, 
Decision-Making at the End of Life in Infants, Children and Adolescents – A Policy of the Paediatrics 
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However, should parents and practitioners disagree – which happens most often when 
practitioners want to withhold or withdraw treatment but parents wish treatment to 
continue – the courts may be called on to determine the issue.12  The best interests of 
the child remains the appropriate legal test. To determine what must be considered in 
this context, we must look to UK decisions. 
 
The clearest guidance comes from the case of Re Wyatt [2005] EWCA Civ 1181; 
[2005] 1 WLR 3995 where an application was made to the court to authorise that a 
young infant not receive intubation and ventilation in the event that she suffered a 
collapsed lung. In that case the Court outlined the following factors that a court would 
need to take into account in determining what would be in the best interests of a child 
in such a case:13  
 
The judge must decide what is in the child’s best interests. In making that 
decision, the welfare of the child is paramount, and the judge must look at the 
question from the assumed point of view of the patient...There is a strong 
presumption in favour of a course of action which will prolong life, but that 
presumption is not irrebuttable...The term “best interest” encompasses 
medical, emotional, and all other welfare issues...The court must conduct a 
balancing exercise in which all the relevant factors are weighed... and a helpful 
way of undertaking this exercise is to draw up a balance sheet.14 
 
The determination of best interests in such a case may also take into account whether 
the child’s quality of life is judged to be ‘intolerable’, but this will not be the sole 
factor.15 It was emphasised that the outcome in each case will be ‘highly fact specific’ 
and it will be up to the judge to strike a balance between benefit and harm.16 
 
b) Parental Refusal 
 
                                                                                                                                            
& Child Health Division of The Royal Australian College of Physicians (2008). For similar 
international guidelines see, Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, Withholding or 
Withdrawing Life Sustaining Treatment in Children: A Framework for Practice, (2nd ed, 2004); 
Committee on Bioethics, ‘Guidelines on Forgoing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment’ (1994) 93 
Pediatrics 532; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Critical care decisions in fetal and neonatal medicine: 
ethical issues, (2006). See also Kei Lui et al, “Perinatal care at the borderlines of viability: a consensus 
statement based on a NSW and ACT consensus workshop” (2006) 185 Medical Journal of Australia 
495.  
12 This is recognised in Australian guidelines: The Royal Australasian College of Physicians, 
Paediatrics & Child Health Division, Decision-Making at the End of Life in Infants, Children and 
Adolescents – A Policy of the Paediatrics & Child Health Division of The Royal Australian College of 
Physicians (2008) p 16. 
13 Re Wyatt (a child) (medical treatment: continuation or order) [2005] EWCA Civ 1181; [2005] 1 
WLR 3995, [87].  
14 For an example where the court adopted the ‘balance sheet’ approach see An NHS Trust v MB [2006] 
EWHC 507 (Fam); [2006] 2 FLR 319, [60]-[81]. 
15 Re Wyatt (a child) (medical treatment: continuation or order) [2005] EWCA Civ 1181; [2005] 1 
WLR 3995, [91]. 
16 Re Wyatt (a child) (medical treatment: continuation or order) [2005] EWCA Civ 1181; [2005] 1 
WLR 3995, [88]-[89].  
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Where the issue is refusal of life-sustaining treatment by a parent, domestic case law 
does exist. These cases generally relate to situations where parents reject life-
sustaining medical treatment due to personal beliefs or religious reasons.  
 
As discussed above, legislation in Queensland allows for blood transfusions to be 
given to children in limited circumstances. If the legislation does not cover a specific 
situation, courts have shown a willingness to authorise the giving of blood products to 
a child.17  
 
Australian courts have also authorised other types of life-sustaining medical treatment 
to be provided to young children where parents have refused consent to such 
treatment. For example, in Re Heather [2003] NSWSC 532 the parents of an eleven 
year old girl with a malignant tumour of the ovary consistently refused consent for 
their child to undergo chemotherapy. The parents wished to explore alternative 
methods of treating her cancer. Medical practitioners were of the opinion that failure 
to commence chemotherapy could jeopardise the child’s life. Orders were then sought 
and granted by the New South Wales Supreme Court for the Department of 
Community Services to authorise procedures that were, on medical advice, considered 
to be in the interests of the child.18 Similarly, in the Re Michael cases (Re Michael 
(1994) 17 Fam LR 584 and Re Michael (No 2) (1994) 17 Fam LR 27), applications 
were made to the Family Court because parents refused consent to a surgical 
procedure aimed at relieving the symptoms of a congenital heart condition suffered by 
their son. Orders were originally made authorising the procedure although, ultimately, 
the parents provided undertakings to the Family Court that they would ensure that 
their child received appropriate medical and/or surgical treatment.  
 
However, a court will not always automatically side with medical practitioners in such 
applications; the guiding principle is always what is in the best interests of the child as 
determined by the facts of each case. Factors that may be relevant to a determination 
of best interests include the medical evidence presented, the options for treatment, the 
risks involved and prospects of success, and the likely pain and discomfort to be 
experienced by the child.  
 
For example, in the UK case of Re T [1997] 1 WLR 242, although medical opinion 
unanimously favoured that a child with a life threatening liver defect be given a liver 
transplant, the Court of Appeal found that the course of action in the best interests of 
the child was for the transplant not to occur, as favoured by the parents. The parents 
had previously witnessed the pain and distress suffered by their son following an 
earlier unsuccessful operation and were concerned about how the surgery and 
subsequent treatment would affect their son. In addition, if the transplant was 
authorised, there was the risk of imposing an unwanted situation upon the mother in 
circumstances where the child’s recovery depended on the parent’s commitment to 
that treatment and any further necessary treatment. The child’s welfare, in this 
circumstance, was highly dependent on the parents. 
 
                                                 
17 See n 8.  
18 [2003] NSWSC 532, [20], [52]. 
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4) Children who have capacity 
 
a) Can they refuse? 
 
Where our concern is children who have capacity (i.e. are Gillick-competent), the 
main issue that arises is whether such children can refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment. Often the children in question will have suffered from a terminal illness for 
a long period of time and may have great insight into their condition; alternatively, 
mature children may hold strong religious beliefs that limit the treatment they are 
willing to accept. 
 
At common law, the position in Australia appears similar to that in the UK: even if a 
child satisfies the test for Gillick-competence, the child’s refusal of consent to life-
sustaining treatment can be overridden by the courts where treatment is considered to 
be in the best interests of the child.19 For example, in the case of Minister for Health v 
AS (2004) 33 Fam LR 223, the Supreme Court of Western Australia – while 
acknowledging that 15 year old ‘L’ was Gillick-competent – authorised the 
administration of a blood transfusion if certain circumstances arose. In that case ‘L’ 
was a practicing Jehovah’s Witness who refused consent to blood products.  
 
Despite this, courts have emphasised that overriding a decision of a Gillick-competent 
or maturing child is not to be done lightly and that the court should take into account 
the views of the child.20 
 
In practice, guidelines from the Royal Australasian College of Physicians suggest that 
some children’s ability to competently participate should be recognised, with it being 
possible for a child to be ‘respected as the main decision-maker’.21 It suggests that 
those over 16 years old should be able to express their preferences about end of life 
care and be part of the decision-making process, including place and situation of their 
death.22  
 
While some commentators are critical that Gillick-competent children – who have the 
legal right to consent to treatment – are not conversely able to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment, it nonetheless seems that the law is not yet ready to relinquish the principle 
of ‘best interests’ in relation to all children.  
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Minister for Health v AS (2004) 33 Fam LR 223, [20]. This approach has been endorsed by some 
legal commentators (e.g. New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Young People and Consent to 
Health Care, Report 119 (2008) [4.48]-[4.50]; J K Mason and G T Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith’s 
Law and Medical Ethics (7th ed, OUP, 2006) [10.52]), but also criticised (e.g. Ian Kennedy and Andrew 
Grubb, Medical Law (3rd ed, Butterworths, 2000) pp 985-989; Lynn Hagger, The Child as Vulnerable 
Patient: Protection and Empowerment (Ashgate, 2009) pp 34-38). 
20 See comments in Minister for Health v AS (2004) 33 Fam LR 223, [23]; Royal Alexandra Hospital 
for Children v J (2005) 33 Fam LR 448, [50]; Re W [1993] Fam 64, 88, 93. 
21 The Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Paediatrics & Child Health Division, n 12, p 7. 
22 The Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Paediatrics & Child Health Division, n 12, p 25. 
